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Abstract
We examine the demise of a multi-stakeholder network that was launched to promote an inclusive 
dairy market in Ethiopia to better understand why nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may develop 
interventions in contexts of poverty that fail to endure after they exit. We identify organizational reflexivity 
– the capacity to recognize and understand the recursive interplay between an intervention and the local 
environment – as a key explanatory mechanism for this intervention outcome. Limited reflexivity not only 
prevented the NGO we studied from properly aligning the intervention with the context (design failures), but 
also prevented the organization from adjusting its intervention when negative feedback emerged (orchestration 
failures), which eventually evolved into the demise of the network (maintenance failure). While our study 
confirms the theoretical premise that NGOs need to contextualize their interventions, we expand current 
knowledge by highlighting the role of organizational reflexivity in this process. Moreover, by showing how 
reflexivity deficits can trigger a cascade of failure, especially when intervening in voids where incumbent firms 
have interests in maintaining the void, our study calls attention to the politicized nature of institutional voids.
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Contexts of poverty are often marked by institutional voids – settings where different formal and 
informal institutional orders interact in ways that impede market participation of the poor (Mair & 
Martí, 2009; Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012). Organizational scholars increasingly study how 
NGOs operate in such void-rich settings to alleviate poverty through market interventions. For 
example, McKague, Zietsma and Oliver (2015) describe how CARE Bangladesh organized small-
holder dairy farmers into producer groups and connected these groups to input suppliers and proces-
sors to improve their household income as well as the overall performance of the dairy value chain. 
Similarly, Venkataraman, Vermeulen, Raaijmakers and Mair (2016) highlight how an Indian NGO 
organized female poultry producers into a cooperative to increase their market participation.
As these examples illustrate, many NGO interventions involve the establishment of novel rela-
tional structures such as cooperatives, self-help groups or exchange platforms. Understanding the 
evolution of these novel social structures as an organizational form is a key question in organiza-
tion science (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), particularly because their fragility may jeopardize 
NGOs’ efforts to realize field-level change (Cloutier & Langley, 2017). Designing interventions 
that ‘stick’ can indeed prove challenging because NGOs typically run donor-funded projects that 
are bound by resource and time pressures. Thus, NGOs cannot simply assume the durability of 
their intervention, but need to actively work towards it.
So far, however, prior studies have tended to concentrate on interventions where NGOs were 
able to build durable relational structures (McKague et al., 2015; Venkataraman et al., 2016). 
This focus on success cases makes it difficult to establish causality between the type of market-
building strategies pursued by NGOs and their intervention outcomes. To establish causality, 
scholars must also study failure cases and determine whether these NGOs engaged in similar or 
different intervention strategies compared to known success cases. In addition, NGOs that have 
successfully created durable interventions in contexts of poverty may be systematically different 
from the larger population of NGOs. If this is true, then scholars need to also examine failed 
interventions in order to generate valid theoretical knowledge and insights that are more broadly 
generalizable.
Accordingly, we set out to increase the theoretical understanding of why NGOs sometimes 
introduce interventions in contexts of poverty that fail to endure after they exit. We examine a 
multi-stakeholder network in the Ethiopian dairy sector that was launched by a development NGO 
(alias ‘Alpha’) as part of a large donor-funded project. Alpha intervened in three other agricultural 
value chains following the same approach and the same set of activities. While Alpha’s efforts to 
build a durable platform for promoting inclusive value chains were successful in the apiculture 
sector, they failed in the dairy sector. Drawing on rich, qualitative longitudinal data, we sought to 
reveal how this failed instance of networking for inclusive markets came about.
Juxtaposing our findings to known success cases in the literature led us to develop a process 
model of failure in NGO interventions. Central to our model is the insight that, under certain condi-
tions, NGOs may have limited reflexive capacity to recognize and understand the recursive inter-
play between their intervention and the contested nature of voids, which in turn can trigger a 
vicious cycle of cascading failures. Our emergent theory clarifies the distinct roles of experiential 
knowledge and organizational monitoring mechanisms in constraining NGO reflexivity, in particu-
lar by suggesting how the former is critical in designing interventions and how the latter is critical 
in orchestrating interventions. These dynamics thus help to explain how different reflexivity 
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deficits may prevent NGOs from properly aligning their interventions with the institutional voids 
they enter (design failures), and also hamper NGOs from making timely adjustments to their inter-
ventions as negative feedback unfolds (orchestration failures), which ultimately may evolve into a 
failure to sustain the intervention after the NGO has exited (maintenance failures). While the 
importance of reflexivity for understanding intervention outcomes has remained hidden in prior 
success cases where NGOs likely possessed the necessary reflexive capacities, we demonstrate 
how the absence of NGO reflexivity is critical for explaining the occurrence of cascading interven-
tion failures.
Our contributions are threefold. First, our study puts internal organizational factors associated 
with NGOs’ reflexive capacities centre stage in studying the interlinked outcomes of their interven-
tions. Addressing calls for more research on failures in aid-led initiatives (Martí & Mair, 2009), we 
go beyond a simple success–failure dichotomy by offering a more holistic, processual view that 
clarifies how constraints in NGO reflexivity can explain the occurrence of cascading intervention 
failures. Second, rather than focusing on ‘opportunity spaces’ to be freely exploited (Mair & Martí, 
2009; Tracey & Phillips, 2011), our study emphasizes the politicized nature of institutional voids 
and the consequent need for NGOs to develop reflexive capacities so they can properly design and 
adapt their interventions to fit with this context. Third, our study heeds calls to view development 
NGOs as distinct organizational actors (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012) and adopt an internal 
perspective on organizations (Suddaby, 2010) by illuminating how the internal structures and pro-
cesses of NGOs may constrain their reflexive capacities for designing and orchestrating robust 
interventions in contexts of poverty.
Background Literature
Institutional voids and NGO interventions
Institutional voids are settings where formal institutions are weak or not effective enough to sup-
port market transactions (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Mair and Martí (2009) have emphasized that 
different formal and informal institutional systems may interact in ways that impede market par-
ticipation of the poor. Voids are thus not ‘empty’ spaces, but are marked by institutional plurality 
(Mair et al., 2012). Prior studies have identified various strategies through which NGOs success-
fully intervene in voids. For instance, NGOs may engage in relational work at different levels of 
analysis: in value chains by forming producer groups and cooperatives (McKague et al., 2015; 
Sutter, Webb, Kistruck, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2017); at the village level by creating self-help groups 
and village organizations (Mair et al., 2012; Mair, Wolf, & Seelos, 2016; Venkataraman et al., 
2016); and at the sector level by launching multi-stakeholder networks (Sparrow & Traoré, 2018). 
In establishing such relational structures, NGOs also engage in cultural work by, for instance, 
drawing on different institutional logics (Venkataraman et al., 2016) or using theatre plays to legiti-
mize the inclusiveness discourse (Mair et al., 2012).
Studies have also shown that successful interventions require NGOs to engage in contextual 
bridging, defined as ‘a process involving the transfer of new meanings, practices, and structures 
into a given context in a way that is sensitive to the norms, practices, knowledge, and relation-
ships that exist in that context’ (McKague et al., 2015, p. 1063). NGOs may hire local staff to 
bridge indigenous knowledge (McKague et al., 2015), make use of ‘insiders’ to win the trust of 
the targeted beneficiaries and build rapport with them (Venkataraman et al., 2016), draw on local 
norms, beliefs and power structures to promote novel ideas (Mair et al., 2016) or engage deeply 
with the local community (Dyck & Silvestre, 2018). Contextualizing interventions is necessary 
for the newly introduced social structures, standards and practices to be accepted by local 
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stakeholders and become embedded in the existing institutional environment (Schouten, Vellema, 
& Van Wijk, 2016).
Another set of activities relates to building local governance structures so as to create local owner-
ship over the promoted change. For instance, Mair et al. (2016, p. 2035) point out how the NGO 
Gram Vikas created both formal and informal governance structures that helped to develop ‘a shared 
commitment to the program’. Venkataraman et al. (2016, p. 16) also highlight that ‘developing a 
sense of ownership was a key element in [the NGO’s] approach to sustaining the self-help groups’. 
Likewise, Schut et al. (2018, p. 8) argue that setting up shared governance structures for multi- 
stakeholder networks helps to build ‘a collaborative ethos’ and ‘shared ownership’ in the network.
Failure in NGO interventions
Despite these advances, current understanding of how NGOs work to fill voids remains selective 
because extant studies have tended to focus on successful interventions (e.g. McKague et al., 2015; 
Venkataraman et al., 2016). However, some studies have alluded to the serious challenges that 
NGOs may face in bringing about structural change, suggesting that failure in NGO interventions 
is a more frequent outcome but poorly understood. For instance, Mair et al. (2012) describe how 
BRAC faced strong resistance to its promotion of gender equality, while other studies highlight 
how NGOs were met with distrust and scepticism by the targeted beneficiaries (Sutter et al., 2017; 
Venkataraman et al., 2016). Most studies have portrayed NGOs as skilfully navigating these chal-
lenges, which entails the risk of depicting NGOs as heroic actors.
Redirecting scholarly attention to failure cases is important because NGOs may find it challeng-
ing to intervene in voids given their unique organizational characteristics (Baur & Palazzo, 2011). 
NGOs typically run donor-funded projects, so their interventions are bound by restricted resources 
and time pressure. The temporary nature of these engagements means that the long-term impact of 
the interventions is inherently fragile, jeopardizing the ability of NGOs to create lasting change 
after they exit their projects (Sutter et al., 2017). These resource constraints are further magnified 
as the legitimacy of NGOs operating in contexts of poverty is increasingly questioned (Chowdhury, 
2017; Khan, Westwood, & Boje, 2010). NGOs typically represent the public good, but their norma-
tive claims may not be shared by the organizations they target (Baur & Palazzo, 2011). Their inter-
ventions may also have unintended consequences (Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 2007). When 
interventions become contested, negative spillover effects on the legitimacy of the acting NGOs 
may occur, which threaten the impact and durability of their interventions.
Given that NGO interventions may more frequently fail than one might expect from the literature, 
we contend that an exclusive focus on success cases undermines theoretical progress in the field. It 
limits the ability to establish causality between the types of market-building strategies pursued by 
NGOs and their intervention outcomes. To establish causality, scholars should also study failure cases 
and determine whether these NGOs engaged in similar or different intervention strategies as com-
pared to known success cases. In addition, NGOs that have successfully created durable interventions 
in contexts of poverty may be systematically different from the larger population of NGOs. If this is 
true, then scholars should also examine failed interventions in connection with the type of NGO in 
order to generate insights that are more broadly generalizable. Accordingly, our study asked: Why do 
NGOs sometimes introduce interventions in contexts of poverty that fail to endure after they exit?
Research Context
We studied how the Ethiopian field office of a Dutch development organization, dubbed Alpha, 
launched a multi-stakeholder network with the aim of making the dairy value chain in Ethiopia 
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more inclusive. Founded in the 1960s with the mission to eradicate global poverty, Alpha employs 
more than 1,300 staff in more than 25 countries. Until 2011, Alpha was largely dependent on the 
Dutch government for financial support. Alpha started operating in Ethiopia by providing famine 
relief and gradually shifted its agenda towards supporting the government’s focus on promoting 
economic development. Ethiopia is one of Africa’s fast-growing economies with agriculture as the 
cornerstone of its economy. While its economic system moved from socialism towards promoting 
a market economy, the economy is still largely controlled by the state.
In 2003, the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Addis Ababa commissioned a study on farmer organ-
izations and market access against the backdrop of the Ethiopian government’s efforts to improve 
the marketing side of agriculture. In 2005, this led to the drafting of a project proposal (dubbed 
‘Promoting Access to Markets’ or PAM) to reduce poverty through improved market access for 
smallholder farmers. Alpha Ethiopia was actively involved in drafting this proposal. The PAM pro-
ject had a budget of 8.05 million euros and ran from 2005 to 2011. Out of 29 potential value chains 
studied for intervention, four agricultural sectors were selected: honey, dairy, oilseeds and pineap-
ple. A key programme tool was the value chain multi-stakeholder networks (henceforth ‘MSNs’). 
The main premise was that these MSNs would promote the development of inclusive value chains 
in the targeted sectors by stimulating knowledge exchange, coordination and governance. For each 
chain, quarterly meetings were organized, involving on average 40 to 50 representatives of organi-
zations from different societal sectors (i.e. business, government, civil society, education).
Alpha’s involvement in the Ethiopian dairy sector
Ethiopia is believed to have the largest livestock population in Africa and offers a favourable envi-
ronment for dairy production. The rising population and increasing income per capita have 
increased the demand for milk and milk products, particularly in urban areas, but the largely tradi-
tional dairy sector lacks the competitiveness to meet this demand. A complex set of constraints 
impedes the development of the sector. The productivity of local breeds is low, while introduced 
breeds do not adapt well; veterinary services are limited; and feed is expensive and often in short 
supply. When Alpha’s PAM programme was launched, farmers had limited possibilities for selling 
their milk. There were only a handful of processors active, mostly around Addis Ababa, of which 
two dominated the market and acted as the price makers. Producer associations were underdevel-
oped and did not improve member access to resources and markets. The relationship between 
producers and processors was fraught over quality issues among others as the government did not 
enforce the dairy quality standards. More broadly, the government paid limited attention to the sec-
tor. These were the kinds of challenges that the PAM dairy programme sought to address.
Methods
Research strategy
We adopted a qualitative case study design (Yin, 2009) that is well-suited to explorative research 
questions aimed at building theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). We selected the Dairy MSN for our study 
on the grounds that in the dairy sector no local network governing body was launched prior to the 
phasing out of the project. Consequently, when Alpha stopped organizing and facilitating the net-
work meetings and activities, so did the Dairy MSN. This outcome of network failure is in sharp 
contrast to the Honey MSN also launched under the PAM programme in that the Honey MSN has 
evolved into the Ethiopian Apiculture Board as the exchange platform for the Ethiopian apiculture 
sector. Hence, the dairy case raised important questions about the relationship between Alpha’s 
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intervention strategies and the network’s demise, and provided a promising setting to build theory 
on a failed NGO intervention.
Data collection
Data collection for the dairy case formed part of a broader research project into all four networks 
under the PAM programme.1 In addition to documentary evidence and field visits, 67 interviews 
were conducted across the four PAM value chains. For the dairy case, we drew on a dedicated 
dataset of archival materials and interviews. The primary source was the minutes of the 18 dairy 
meetings; these were written by Ethiopian consultants assigned by Alpha. The extensive minutes 
− 20 to 40 pages on average per meeting − provided rich longitudinal data on the course of events, 
topics of discussion, and participants. Programme documents helped to gain insights into the over-
all PAM programme and developments in the four targeted agricultural sectors. The mid-term and 
post-implementation programme review reports, written by external consultants, were particularly 
useful for gaining a better understanding of Alpha’s performance in promoting inclusive markets.
To address the risk that these archival data might be incomplete or biased (Ventresca & Mohr, 
2002) and to facilitate data triangulation (Yin, 2009), we supplemented the archival data with semi-
structured interviews with dairy stakeholders while the programme was still running. In total, 17 
reports were produced on interviews with chain actors and chain influencers. In identifying our 
respondents, we made sure to include respondents who had exited the network due to conflict or 
who were unwilling to participate. The interview protocol focused on the main problems and oppor-
tunities in the dairy chain, meeting dynamics and outcomes, and the overall perception of progress 
in the dairy value chain. The interviews lasted between one and three hours. Extensive notes taken 
during the interviews formed the basis for interview reports, which were then shared with the 
respondents for review.2 Table 1 presents an overview of the data sources used in this study.
Data analysis
Our data analysis was highly iterative, moving back and forth between data and emergent theoreti-
cal ideas (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999). We distinguish four stages in our analytical process to 
understand and explain how the failed exit strategy came about. In the first stage, we aimed to get 
a broad understanding of the Dairy MSN. We drafted a detailed summary document of the 18 meet-
ing minutes, using the agenda items as the structuring logic. By closely examining every passage, 
we also tabulated descriptive data, such as who participated in the meetings, in what role, and what 
was discussed (see Table 2).
In the second stage, we examined the meetings more closely by coding the minutes with the aid 
of qualitative software ATLAS.ti. We started with ‘open coding’, closely examining texts to deter-
mine codes that fit the data (Berg, 2004, pp. 280–1). Codes captured why and how the meetings 
were organized, what was discussed and how stakeholders reportedly responded to these efforts. 
This exercise not only made us aware of Alpha’s activities to build the network ‘from scratch’, but 
also revealed that mobilizing support was difficult. Participants reportedly questioned the net-
work’s representativeness and particular activities. Engaging in a more focused analysis of Alpha’s 
agency, we subsequently combined several codes into broader, more abstract categories that cap-
tured Alpha’s main intervention strategies and their outcomes at the network level. This gave us a 
deep understanding of the unfolding of the Dairy MSN (see Figure 1) and helped us to draft a 
detailed narrative as ‘sensemaking strategy’ (Langley, 1999, p. 703).
In the third stage, we probed more deeply into understanding why building the Dairy MSN was 
so challenging. Comparing the successful Honey MSN – where initial contextual conditions dif-
fered substantially from those in dairy – led us to believe that how Alpha’s intervention interacted 
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with the local context would help to shed light on the failure we observed in dairy. Hence, we 
coded the dairy interview reports, project documents and external evaluation reports and revisited 
the meeting minutes to identify the contextual conditions in the dairy sector and to what extent 
Table 1. Overview of Sources Used.
Archival data MSN • 18 sets of meeting minutes (20-40 pages per meeting on average)
• 1 Alpha case briefing
Archival data PAM programme • 2 project proposals (start, extension)
• 2 scoping research reports
• 6 progress reports to donors
•  2 external evaluation reports on the PAM programme 
commissioned by Alpha: mid-term (2008) & post-implementation 
(2011)
•  1 report (2012) on experiences with the PAM approach 
published by Alpha
• PAM webpages, retrieved through web archives
Interview reports (n = 17) • Research institute/consultant (n = 3)
• Input supplier & business association (n = 2)
• Producer organization (n = 3)
• Collection centre (n = 1)
• Processor (n = 4)
• Government ministry (n = 1)
• Bank (n = 1)
• Alpha (n = 2)
Table 2. Meeting Statistics of the Dairy MSN.
Dairy
Total number of events 18






Total number of new entrants 102
Total number of exits 77
Issues on meeting agenda (total number)  
Input 17
Production 16




Access to finance 5
Trust in chain 3
Other 9
Presenters (total number)  
Knowledge users (chain actors) 27
Knowledge brokers (e.g. researchers, consultants) 54





















van Wijk et al. 1399
Alpha’s intervention matched them. We found misalignment between Alpha’s intervention and 
initial contextual conditions and how this misalignment significantly affected the unfolding of the 
Dairy MSN. While going through the data, we were also attentive to the question why Alpha did 
not respond earlier to these first signs of what we saw as instances of failed contextual bridging. In 
the external mid-term and post-implementation review reports, we identified specific references to 
internal organizational dynamics that seem to have impeded Alpha’s contextual bridging, which 
we interpreted as limited organizational reflexivity. In this stage, we also shared our case narrative 
with a key informant to validate our findings and discuss emergent theoretical ideas.
In the final stage, we juxtaposed our findings with other published cases of market-facilitating 
NGOs to sharpen our insights (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999). Systematically comparing and 
contrasting our failure case with published success cases forced us to explicate the underlying 
mechanisms behind the distinct outcomes. We realized that the degree of organizational reflexiv-
ity was centre stage in understanding the failed instances of contextual bridging we observed in 
our case. This helped us to theorize about different kinds of process failures and their interrela-
tions. Table 3 summarizes our iterative coding process, presenting the data structure (Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). An overview of illustrative quotes is available from the first author 
on request.
Findings
In this section we first highlight how Alpha actively promoted its Dairy MSN, while also attempt-
ing to rebalance the power relations in the dairy value chain. We then clarify how these activities 
misaligned with the initial contextual conditions in the dairy sector, exemplifying design failures. 
We continue by showcasing how Alpha failed to properly respond to these first signs of misalign-
ment, indicating orchestration failures. We then illuminate how this ultimately led to a failed exit 
strategy and demise of the network, showing a maintenance failure of the novel relational struc-
ture. We conclude by discussing Alpha’s limited organizational reflexivity as the explanatory 
mechanism for the manifestation of these failures.
Networking for inclusive markets
Alpha engaged in three strategies to establish its platform for exchange among dairy stakeholders.
Creating and exchanging knowledge. The first strategy was to stimulate knowledge creation and 
sharing by organizing formal presentations. In the initial meetings, Alpha invited key stakeholders 
to share their views on the challenges and opportunities in the dairy value chain. Such presenta-
tions became a recurrent item on the meeting agenda and covered a wide range of topics, as 
depicted in Table 2. Presentations were mainly given by consultants, researchers and recipients of 
funds from the PAM programme. In addition to presentations, Alpha facilitated exchange visits to 
promote ‘best practices’ like a work visit to a farmer cooperatives’ new processing plant (MSN-9) 
and an exchange visit to Kenya (MSN-12).
Establishing local governance structure. Alpha’s second strategy was to establish a local governance 
structure and thereby build local capacity to govern the network as exit strategy. Each PAM net-
work was governed by a central body of a chain leader representing the sector and guaranteeing 
‘the ownership of the MSN’ (web archives PAM); an Alpha-nominated chain facilitator to facilitate 
communications, prepare the meetings, and draft minutes3; and a lead advisor from Alpha to over-
see the developments in the respective value chain in relation to PAM’s objectives.
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Table 3. Data structure.
First-order codes Second-order themes Aggregate theme
Organizing presentations Creating and exchanging 
knowledge
Networking for 
inclusive marketsOrganizing field visits
Launching new (research) projects
Using local business service providers Establishing local governance 
structureNominating chain leader
Launching executive committees
Emphasizing demand-driven fund 
application
Stimulating ownership over 
change
Offering opportunities for participatory 
governance
Refraining from meeting participation by 
NGO’s programme manager
Shifting the meeting language from English 
to Amharic
Discursive appeals to see network as theirs
Support ProMilk Building business support 
organizations
Rebalancing power 
relations in the chainDiscuss the launch of Dairy Board as exit 
strategy
Addressing distrust in chain
Troubled relations between processors and 
producers
Financing chain interventions
Extant duopolistic market structure 
impeding producers
Offering funds for chain interventions
Dairy seen as import substitute rather than 
export commodity
Misalignment with government 
interests
Design failures
Little governmental interest in dairy sector
Incumbents questioning support to ProMilk Misalignment with incumbent 
interestsIncumbents questioning the mandate of 
NGO to intervene in the dairy sector
Questioning the strong focus on 
smallholders
Limited fund applications Misalignment with sector 
capacityLow capacity of dairy stakeholders
Questioning the usefulness of research 
activities
Promoting school milk feeding programme Limited collective wins achieved Orchestration failures
Discussing the need for quality standards
Questioning the lack of participation of 
market parties in the meetings
Limited institutional embedding
Questioning the lack of participation of 
government institutions in the meetings
Concerns about exit of Alpha Limited capacity development
Critiquing the high rotation among 
participants
PAM project as innovation Limited experiential knowledge Limited organizational 
reflexivityM&E system within the organization Weak organizational mechanisms 
for reflexive learning
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Alpha had a strong preference for a processing company to be elected as the chain leader. Being 
in the middle of the chain, processors were expected to have a strong self-interest in creating both 
upstream and downstream chain linkages and being able to promote market and quality require-
ments throughout the sector (MSN-1, pp. 15–16). This worked in the Ethiopian apiculture sector 
where Alpha partnered with a local lead firm that was widely recognized and accepted as industry 
champion prior to the formal launch of the Honey MSN. In the Dairy MSN, however, there was 
only one processing company present at the first meeting. Elections for the chain leadership posi-
tion were thus postponed to the second meeting when five small and medium-sized processors 
attended. Network participants were given the option of either electing one of these firms or nomi-
nating the intended president of the Ethiopian Milk Producers and Processors Association (hence-
forth dubbed ‘ProMilk’), which had just been established with the aid of Alpha. This president 
– who was also chair of a large dairy cooperative that was planning to start with dairy processing 
– was ultimately elected chain leader.
Stimulating ownership over change. The third strategy Alpha adopted was to stimulate ownership 
over the change process in three main ways. First, Alpha encouraged participatory decision-mak-
ing in the meetings. For example, the network’s goals as laid down in the Strategic Intervention 
Plan were regularly discussed and participants had a say in allocating funds for research to address 
knowledge gaps they identified. The second way to encourage local ownership was to adjust the 
set-up of the meetings. From meeting 7 onwards, Alpha decided to alter the meeting language from 
English to the local language. Similarly, Alpha’s PAM programme manager refrained from partici-
pating in meetings 7 and 9 ‘to enable the stakeholders to voice their issues freely and to empower 
[them] so that they will carry the process forward even in the absence of the programme’ (MSN-6, 
p. 5). Finally, Alpha promoted a ‘demand-driven’ approach to funding: chain actors themselves had 
to take the initiative to draft funding proposals.
Rebalancing power relations in the dairy value chain
At the start of the PAM project, the Ethiopian dairy sector was marked by a duopolistic market 
structure: although a handful of small-scale processors were active, two incumbent processing 
companies dominated the market, of which one was a parastatal that was privatized two years after 
the start of PAM. This duopolistic market structure seriously impeded market participation by 
dairy farmers. They had few alternatives to sell their milk, while the processors were also in the 
position of ‘price makers’ (RES-13). To improve the position of dairy farmers in the chain, Alpha 
established a new business association and financed different chain interventions. Collectively, 
these strategies contributed to what McKague and Siddiquee (2014, p. 122) call ‘rebalancing 
power relationships for the benefit of poor producers’.
Building business support organizations. Alpha was strongly in favour of business associations for 
value chain development, as they could lobby the government for strong sector policies and pro-
vide services to their members (Alpha, 2005a). Throughout the PAM programme Alpha helped 
launch and strengthen business associations, including ProMilk in 2005. Founding members were 
small and medium-sized processors and nascent cooperative processors. The president of ProMilk 
was also the chair of a large dairy cooperative with over 800 smallholder farms, which was in the 
process of undertaking processing activities. As this president was elected as the ‘chain leader’ of 
the Dairy MSN, it was assumed that ProMilk would play a key role in leveraging change in the 
dairy value chain. As such, network members were regularly updated in the meetings on the chal-
lenges this business association faced to become a formal entity and secure funding for its 
professionalization.
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Financing chain interventions. In addition to developing business support organizations, Alpha 
offered several funds for interventions to achieve the goals set out in the dairy’s Strategic Interven-
tion Plan. Examples of funded activities include farmer trainings on milk hygiene and quality, 
experiments with using aluminium rather than plastic cans for milk collection, an exchange visit to 
the new processing plant of a large dairy cooperative, and the drafting of a bankable business plan 
to secure investor support for such a plant. This latter focus on establishing new (cooperative) 
processors was explained at the first meeting:
By establishing their own processing plants, [cooperatives could] create a sustainable milk market for their 
members as well as other suppliers. The milk price would not be dictated by other private companies, [the] 
milk price for the producers will not fluctuate by seasonality (fasting seasons) and the profit from the 
business will go to the cooperative members who, in most cases, are the milk producers/suppliers. (MSN-
1, p. 10)
In an interview, Alpha’s dairy lead advisor clarified further that by increasing the competition 
through new entrants, ‘processors are willing to pay better prices for higher quality. . . [and] the 
increased competition will stimulate them to engage in contracts and training for their suppliers’. 
The increased processing capacity did indeed increase competition for the supply of raw milk, 
leading to increased income for farmers (Alpha, 2009b). Under the programme, Alpha would ulti-
mately provide support to eight new processors, who represent about half of the total processed 
dairy market supply (Alpha, 2012).
Design failures
Extant studies suggest that a critical step in poverty interventions by NGOs is to be sensitive to the 
local norms, values, knowledge bases and relations (Dyck & Silvestre, 2018; McKague et al., 
2015; Venkataraman et al., 2016). Our findings suggest that when such sensitivity is lacking, 
design failures become more likely – misalignments between intervention and initial contextual 
conditions that likely may affect the development path of the intervention. In our case, Alpha 
underestimated three complexities at hand and how these might interact with its intervention.
Misalignment with government interests. At the inception of the PAM programme, the Ethiopian 
government was primarily interested in supporting export-oriented commodities such as coffee, 
honey and flowers to increase foreign exchange reserves (Alpha, 2005a). As aptly summarized by 
the respondent from the Ministry of Trade and Industry: ‘If you go for export, you know the gov-
ernment will support you.’ Unlike honey, dairy was not considered an export commodity and not a 
government priority. And Alpha’s approach to dairy as an import substitute (Alpha, 2005b) was 
initially not recognized by the government. In fact, most respondents lamented the lack of govern-
ment attention to the sector, complaining that the dairy sector was only considered as a ‘secondary 
economic activity’ to supplement household consumption or as a ‘hobby’ (RES-9).
Misalignment with incumbent interests. From the very start of the PAM programme, the two incum-
bent companies showed reluctance to participate in Alpha’s initiative. They viewed Alpha as a 
traditional development NGO serving the interests of producers and cooperatives and expected 
Alpha to engage in activities like farmer training and capacity building. Even more so, Alpha 
started to intervene in a market characterized by tension and distrust, particularly between produc-
ers and processors. Producers felt that the rejection rates by processors were too high and prices 
paid too low, while processors complained about the sub-standard quality of the raw milk and 
farmers’ low quality awareness.
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While prior to the official launch of the Dairy MSN, Alpha had noted that ‘the absence [in a 
workshop] (and the apparent reluctance to cooperate) of one of the biggest milk processing compa-
nies in Ethiopia was unfortunate’ (Alpha, 2006, p. 14), it seemingly showed little sensitivity to the 
incumbent firms’ position and the troubled relations between producers and processors when design-
ing the intervention. This is suggested by its scoping report; the dairy chain scored similar to the 
other chains under study on its collaborative ethos (Alpha, 2005b). Another indicator is its support 
for the launch of business association ProMilk with nascent cooperative processors among the 
founding members and its support for the nomination of ProMilk’s president – who was also the 
chair of a large dairy cooperative – as chain leader of the Dairy MSN in the network formation stage. 
In so doing, Alpha was taking sides in the divide between incumbent processors and producers.
An alternative would have been to adopt a lead-firm strategy, which focuses on established local 
firms and their linkages with (smallholder) suppliers (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). By 
transferring knowledge and resources to their suppliers, local lead firms may not only increase 
their own business performance, but also improve the market opportunities and benefits for their 
suppliers (Humphrey & Navas-Alemán, 2010). In the apiculture value chain, for instance, Alpha 
supported the local lead firm’s interest to export honey to the European Union, which aligned with 
the government’s export-led growth strategy. Working with this frontrunner company created rel-
evant spillovers for the other seven honey processors/traders and leveraged impact for their small-
holder suppliers, the latter aligning with Alpha’s interest in promoting inclusive markets. In the 
dairy sector, however, adopting a lead-firm strategy would have implied partnering with already 
very powerful players, of which one was still a parastatal at the start of the programme. Informal 
conversations with Alpha’s staff and internal documents suggest that this was considered problem-
atic for ideological reasons. Illustrative is the next quote from an internal progress report: ‘Due to 
our support, this monopoly has now been broken by other processors’ (Alpha, 2009b, p. 13).
Misalignment with sector capacity. Compared to the other agricultural value chains under the PAM 
programme, the capacity of the dairy sector to engage in participatory deliberations and mobilize 
for collective action was limited. The sector was marked by ‘low capacitated stakeholders’ (RES-
13) and even ‘the biggest processors have a limited mind-set and cannot lead the sector’ (RES-8). 
In effect, from the very start the Dairy MSN showed signs of misalignment with sector capacities. 
For instance, in the second meeting, the chain facilitator observed that there was a lack of leader-
ship to develop the chain and poor commitment to the network. Likewise, in the third meeting, it 
was noted that as the only sector under the PAM programme, the dairy sector under-utilized the 
available programme funds. This under-utilization became a recurrent agenda item. Explanations 
were sought in the members’ lack of proposal-drafting skills and difficulties in raising the required 
own contribution (MSN-8, p. 3). Another indicator was the slow organizational development of 
business association ProMilk, reportedly because ‘members pull in different directions’ (MSN-7, 
p. 3) and are ‘not ready to work together’ (MSN-10, p. 3). Finally, Alpha’s knowledge creation and 
exchange strategy through the organization of formal presentations did not fully match the capac-
ity, needs and interests of the dairy stakeholders. Although interview respondents said that the 
meetings had helped them ‘to think differently’ (RES-1), seek solutions (RES-17) and obtain rel-
evant market intelligence (RES-5), participants also questioned the relevance of certain presenta-
tions and field visits and critiqued the academic nature of the presentations, having little value for 
dairy farmers (e.g. MSN-8, p. 2).
Orchestration failures
Our data suggest that the above design failures constrained network-level outcomes early on in the 
change process. That is, the Dairy MSN failed to create collective wins necessary to motivate and 
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sustain network participation. The embedding of the network in the wider institutional environ-
ment was limited, while the network showed little progress in developing the collective capacity 
for steering the change process. Evidence of such slow progress in the network’s evolution was 
readily transparent in the first meeting minutes and by 2008 the dairy value chain was still largely 
dependent on Alpha’s input, as was pointed out in the programme’s mid-term review conducted by 
external consultants. Still, Alpha did not substantially alter its activities. Rather, it followed the 
general recommendations made by the external consultants for all value chains under the PAM 
programme. As such, we define the limited network-level outcomes as manifestations of orches-
tration failures – failures to adapt the intervention in a timely manner to the negative feedback born 
of the initial misalignment between intervention and local context.
Limited collective wins achieved. The misalignment between Alpha’s intervention and the incumbent 
processors’ interest in safeguarding their dominant market position, together with the government’s 
relatively low priority to the dairy sector, seriously hampered the achievement of collective wins 
– benefits from network participation that accrue to the sector as a whole. These wins are critical 
for creating commitment among participants to value chain interventions (Morris, 2001). For 
instance, the school milk initiative to enhance nutrition among children and expand market oppor-
tunities announced in meeting 2 petered out, as no government ministry took ownership. Moreo-
ver, the debate about quality standards in the sector never really took off, even though raw milk 
quality was a major concern for both processors and producers. Alpha’s decision not to pursue a 
local lead firm strategy made instigating the quality debate more challenging. Large local firms are 
in a position to define and set quality standards as well as create market demand and pressure for 
their adoption by downstream producers (Gereffi et al., 2005). Without a powerful local lead firm, 
the quality debate in the dairy meetings was largely driven by consultants, researchers and Alpha’s 
advisors, who could only urge and train producers to take quality and hygiene matters seriously. 
The Ethiopian Quality and Standards Authority also gave two presentations on existing milk stand-
ards, but as the latter were voluntary, the Authority had little clout.
Limited institutional embedding. The misalignment between Alpha’s intervention and the local context 
also led to low levels of institutional embedding – the degree of sustained participation by organiza-
tions from different societal sectors in the meetings. Most importantly, the two incumbent processors 
hardly participated in the meetings.4 This lack of participation was noted by network participants, and 
it was believed that their absence seriously impeded the achievement of collective results. The main 
reason is that the incumbent processors did not recognize the Dairy MSN as a representative plat-
form; it was perceived to be overly representative of small dairies and cooperatives. Nor did it help 
that Alpha supported the market entry of new (cooperative) processors. In effect, the incumbent 
processors accused Alpha of creating unfair market competition and viewed Alpha as what Human 
and Provan (2000, p. 356) would call an ‘activist’ network convener. As one stated:
Alpha has engaged in activities that it should not have, such as organizing and assisting (technical, material 
and financial) producers and particularly [small and medium-sized] processors. Such interventions distort 
the playing field for the development of the competitive dairy market in the country. [. . .] We reached here 
through several ups and downs and if others are supported by Alpha, they will be able to easily compete 
with us [. . .] The launch of an Ethiopian dairy board is the type of intervention we expect from NGOs and 
donors such as Alpha. (RES-9)
The limited institutional embedding of the Dairy MSN was also exemplified by the failure of rel-
evant government ministries to participate in the meetings. The ministry representatives were 
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frequently rotated and had little or no power in government decision-making and policy processes. 
As a result, they failed to diffuse and implement the new knowledge within their organizations. 
This lack of government involvement was explicitly mentioned by the interview respondents who 
wanted the government to develop strong sector policies and participate in the meetings, and the 
following question was raised in the meeting minutes: ‘How much of our effort could be effective 
with such limited involvement of the policy makers?’ (MSN-15, p. 15). Despite Alpha’s efforts to 
mobilize the public sector, the network failed to spark the government’s interest in dairy during the 
PAM project.
Limited capacity development. The misalignment between Alpha’s intervention and the incumbent 
interests also affected Alpha’s efforts to build sector capacity for change through its support to 
business association ProMilk. Not only did ProMilk experience start-up difficulties and internal 
struggles among its members of small and medium-sized processors and producer organizations, 
it also lacked political clout as the two incumbent processors withheld their support from the 
organization. In an interview, we observed how the incumbent company’s respondent pronounced 
the name ‘ProMilk’ with a sour expression as he argued that joining ProMilk was not an attractive 
proposition for the company, given the clashing interests of producers and processors. The other 
incumbent’s representative added that the organization lacked legitimate authority to influence 
the government for strong sector policies. The refusal of the two incumbent processors to join 
ProMilk and ProMilk’s own limited organizational development also raised internal debates 
within Alpha on how to continue supporting this organization. Recognizing that processors had 
almost no interest in the association, Alpha questioned ‘whether it is useful to have the producers 
and processors organized in one association or whether to focus on strengthening different groups’ 
(Alpha, 2010, p. 30).
The misalignment with sector capacities also affected the patterns of network participation. 
Turnover was high (see Table 2) and commitment to participate in the meetings was low with many 
participants leaving the meeting after the lunch break (RES-14). The use of English that farmers 
could not understand in meetings during the first 18 months, the repetitive meeting format and the 
questionable added value of certain presentations and field trips were all factors that played a role. 
More importantly, however, is that the high network turnover limited the creation of a collective 
knowledge base. As Alpha’s dairy advisor stated: ‘The high rotation and irregular participation of 
members resulted in slow and unaggressive knowledge dissemination and internalization.’ Finally, 
leadership remained problematic in the network. When the dairy network’s chain leader resigned 
and a new chain leader had to be elected, only one person volunteered for the position: the owner 
of a small private dairy-producing enterprise that had successfully started milk-processing with the 
aid of Alpha’s PAM programme. In meeting 15, this entrepreneur was elected as the new chain 
leader, but ‘she [was] not strong enough to steer the network towards change’ (RES-8).
Limited organizational reflexivity
Why did Alpha display little sensitivity to the complexities at hand in the dairy sector during its 
initial design decisions? Why did Alpha not significantly change its course of action while the early 
meeting minutes showed clear evidence of design failure and its consequences for the network’s 
evolution, also pointed out in the programme’s mid-term review? Our data suggest that Alpha 
lacked the organizational reflexivity to do so. Drawing on Staber and Sydow (2002, p. 410), we 
define organizational reflexivity as the extent to which an organization has the capacity to recog-
nize and understand the recursive interplay between an intervention and the local environment in 
which it operates. Our data suggest that such organizational reflexivity is contingent on (a) the 
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degree to which an organization has the experiential knowledge to anticipate and understand how 
its intervention might recursively interact with the local environment and (b) the degree to which 
organizational routines are in place to effectively monitor this interplay.
Limited experiential knowledge. While the value chain approach has since become a popular devel-
opment tool used by a range of actors (Humphrey & Navas-Alemán, 2010; McKague & Siddique, 
2014), it was still an innovation when the PAM programme was launched, not only for Alpha and 
the Ethiopian stakeholders, but also for the development sector at large. The PAM programme 
deviated from the many supply-driven interventions that existed at the time by emphasizing that 
increasing farmer productivity alone was not enough. Collaboration with the private sector, such as 
processors, traders and exporters, was also needed to ensure a market for the increased production. 
In addition, the programme moved beyond the sole focus on smallholder farmers to promote broad-
based change through multi-actor networking (Alpha, 2005a; 2012). The following quotes are 
illustrative:
PAM was innovation: Alpha was a ‘trendsetter’ to start a platform with its main focus on and active 
collaboration with the private sector. Other donors mainly focus on the public sector or on smallholder 
farmers. (RES-8)
Alpha’s PAM programme entered the as yet largely unexplored field of facilitating multi-actor change. [It] 
provided development actors in Ethiopia with a unique opportunity to experiment with the value chain 
approach in a pro-poor context. (Alpha, 2012, p. 39)
Being part of the development sector that historically focused on poor producers, Alpha had 
little experience in working with private sector parties. This seems to have impeded the organiza-
tion from realistically assessing the interaction between its intervention and the local context. As 
aptly summarized in the post-implementation review, it was ‘a business-oriented program’ in a 
‘development-minded’ organization (Alpha, 2011, p. 28).
Weak organizational mechanisms for reflexive learning. In its 2012 report on the PAM programme, 
Alpha emphasizes the importance of organizational reflexivity:
It is important for practitioners involved in any development intervention to step back once in a while and 
reflect on the bigger picture. With the pressures of day-to-day practice, however, there is little time to focus 
on what has worked and what hasn’t, whether interventions started in the past still makes sense against the 
backdrop of new developments, and if (or when) it is necessary to adjust one’s approach. All too often, 
today’s priorities take precedence over what is important for achieving results in the long run. (Alpha, 
2012, p. 59)
However, the organizational mechanisms to prompt such reflexivity, such as appropriate monitor-
ing and evaluation systems, were largely absent at the start of the programme. As stated in the 
post-implementation review:
PAM at the time of its creation did not really fit in the portfolio of Alpha. [. . .] Alpha’s core structure 
(culture, administrative and financial systems as well as their own monitoring and evaluation system) was 
not really conducive/appropriate to run an innovative business-oriented programme such as PAM (Alpha, 
2011, p. 24)
This was also observed by the consultants in the 2008 mid-term review: Alpha was ‘not structuring 
its learning; most learning is individual and implicit’ (Alpha, 2008, p. 8). Prompted by this 
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evaluation, Alpha improved its organizational mechanisms for reflexive learning. For instance, 
Alpha’s staff started to draft case studies on lessons learned, a learning coordinator was nominated, 
and external research was commissioned (Alpha, 2012). However, the post-implementation review 
report pointed out that these measures were too little and too late (Alpha, 2011).
Thus, we suggest that the lack of experiential knowledge in networking with private sector par-
ties for inclusive value chains as well as the lack of established organizational mechanisms to col-
lect, share and reflect on how this novel approach to poverty alleviation played out in practice 
seriously hampered Alpha in anticipating and recognizing the (potential) setbacks in contextualizing 
its intervention to the Ethiopian dairy sector in good time. It should be noted that Alpha’s limited 
organizational reflexivity was also at play in the Honey MSN. It posed less of a problem in this case, 
however, because initial design decisions were congruent with the local conditions and consequently 
the network activities generated mainly positive feedback on the network’s evolution.
Failed exit strategy
Towards the phasing out of the project, however, Alpha became aware that it needed to work on its 
exit strategy from the Dairy MSN and in meeting 16 the ‘possible future home of [the MSN] meet-
ings’ was explicitly put on the agenda (MSN-16, p. 13). Not only did the project funding end, but 
Alpha also aimed to focus on sector development rather than meeting facilitation. Yet the limited 
capacity development in the form of business association ProMilk posed serious challenges for 
Alpha’s exit strategy, as shown in the quotes from Alpha staff:
I am worried about the sustainability of the meetings: who will take over the responsibility after Alpha is 
phased-out? ProMilk is not strong enough and only consists of processors and producers who are in 
conflict. (RES-3)
How can we create structures that can operate on their own if Alpha exits? [. . .] How can we push the 
sector forward and Alpha to the back? (RES-11)
This concern was shared by many interviewees, who realized that Alpha’s role was coming to an 
end. As one participant put it: ‘In life, a teacher cannot always stand behind you and we have to 
work together to do it ourselves now’ (RES-17). Business association ProMilk, however, was not 
considered capable of assuming the role of network convener, as the following quotes aptly 
illustrate:
ProMilk will fail to take over the Dairy MSN as the association is not yet strong enough to take over [the 
network governance]. Alpha’s PAM should at least strengthen them for another two years. [. . .] The Dairy 
MSN will fail to exist after Alpha phases out. (RES-5)
When Alpha phases out, the network will collapse. It is always like that. There is no one to organize it. 
(RES-2)
Hence, Alpha reconsidered its strategy to rebalance power relations in the dairy chain by sup-
porting ProMilk and started to promote an alternative institution, the dairy board. In meeting 16, 
the dairy board was presented as a ‘workable option’ to take over Alpha’s network governance 
tasks and activities (MSN-16, p. 13). Modelled on the rather successful dairy boards in Kenya and 
Tanzania, the Ethiopian dairy board would be a legal institution with representatives from the dairy 
sector, including government ministries, with the aim of improving the policy and business envi-
ronment for the dairy sector. The launch of the dairy board was also an attempt by Alpha to win 
over the incumbent processors and get the government more involved. The incumbents believed 
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that the dairy board was ‘the missing institution’ (RES-9) for developing the Ethiopian dairy sector 
as it could set and enforce the much-desired quality standards. Another reason for proposing the 
dairy board was that the MSNs were not legal entities and had an ‘uncertain institutional status’ 
(Alpha, 2012, p. 33). As Alpha argued in its PAM extension proposal (2009a, p. 31): ‘After PAM 
ends, it is important for the MSN meetings to continue. For that process, there is a need to merge 
it into a legal institution.’ This need to formally institutionalize the Dairy MSN was widely recog-
nized by our respondents:
The Dairy MSN has no power. There is no core group of network members, they are constantly changing. 
Moreover, there is no responsibility or accountability; in short, there are no defined roles for the network 
members. (RES-5)
The network is a free forum, an exchange forum, where stakeholders in the dairy chain exchange 
information, technologies, and contact with other stakeholders. [. . .] In the meetings many action points 
are agreed upon. However, if the implementation fails, there is no accountability mechanism to follow up 
on the activities. (RES-3)
Besides exploring the launch of a dairy board, Alpha put the issue of (dis)trust between produc-
ers and processors explicitly on the agenda of meeting 17, arguing that all capacity-building efforts 
would fail if there was no chain collaboration (MSN-17, p. 14). Alpha also supported ProMilk to 
organize two bilateral meetings to discuss the troubled business relations, but most processors did 
not attend (MNS-18). While participants widely supported the idea of launching the dairy board to 
ensure the network’s durability, give the sector a voice and provide a forum for resolving chain 
problems, these developments came too late. Alpha’s phasing-out of the project coincided with the 
collapse of the network as there was no organization capable of taking over the governance of 
network activities and participants.
Towards a Process Model of Cascading Failures in NGO 
Interventions
Drawing on our findings and juxtaposing them to known success cases in the literature, we present 
a process model of cascading failures in NGO interventions (see Figure 2). Central to our model is 
the notion that institutional voids compel NGOs to design interventions that are consistent with 
their social mission, which produce important outcomes during implementation that may affect 
voids. We argue that NGOs’ reflexive capacity to recognize and understand this interplay between 
intervention and context varies, which affects their ability to properly contextualize the interven-
tion. Our emergent theory clarifies the distinct roles of experiential knowledge and organizational 
routines in constraining the reflexivity of NGOs, showing how the combination of different reflex-
ivity deficits can trigger a cascade of failure by preventing NGOs from properly aligning their 
intervention with the voids they enter (design failures) and making timely adjustments as negative 
feedback unfolds (orchestration failures), which may then evolve into a failure to sustain the inter-
vention after the NGO has exited (maintenance failures). Rather than a distinct activity that NGOs 
engage in, our model thus depicts contextual bridging as an ongoing, constitutive force undergird-
ing the design, implementation and exit phases of an intervention.
Organizational reflexivity and design failures
The starting point of our model is that institutional voids that impede market participation of the 
poor provide ‘opportunity spaces’ for motivated NGOs and entrepreneurs (Mair & Martí, 2009; 
van Wijk et al. 1409
Tracey & Phillips, 2011). Our case comparisons have revealed that the scope of opportunity may 
differ substantially across settings, however. For instance, in the Bangladeshi dairy sector, three 
large processors were open to the idea of collaborating with CARE, including the commercial arm 
of the country’s largest NGO (McKague et al., 2015). In our case, however, the incumbent proces-
sors were consistently reluctant to engage with Alpha, because they viewed it as a traditional 
development organization that focused on capacitating poor producers. Holding market power, 
they were also wary of market interference that could change the status quo. While Mair et al. 
(2012) remind us that voids are not ‘empty spaces’, our study thus suggests that voids are full – not 
just full of institutions, but also power relationships, capabilities and other actors beyond the tar-
geted beneficiaries that may present significant obstacles for intervening in voids.
Given the politically charged nature of voids, NGOs should be attentive and sensitive to the 
local context when designing their interventions. Prior studies have acknowledged this point by 
highlighting the importance of contextual bridging (McKague et al., 2015; Venkataraman et al., 
2016). However, our study suggests that contextual bridging by NGOs may not always be effec-
tive. While Alpha stimulated the development of indigenous knowledge and practices by organiz-
ing participatory network meetings, hiring local business service providers and establishing local 
governance structures, among others, these efforts had little effect because Alpha failed to contex-
tualize its intervention in three important ways. The selection of dairy was not aligned with govern-
ment priorities; the support to new (cooperative) processors was at odds with incumbent interests; 
and the use of a multi-stakeholder network as an organizational vehicle for promoting inclusive 
markets did not dovetail with the sector’s capacity, exemplifying design failures.
To explain this lack of contextual sensitivity, our data analysis revealed the mechanism of 
organizational reflexivity. In our case, Alpha had little experiential knowledge in value chain 
Figure 2. A Process Model of Failure in NGO Interventions.
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interventions and multi-actor change processes, which constrained its ability to critically reflect on 
the (potential) recursive interplay between intervention and context. Ideology also played a role 
here as Alpha could not accept a key characteristic of value chain dynamics: lead firms drive the 
organization of the chain (Gereffi et al., 2005). In the dairy case, this would have implied partner-
ing with already very powerful processors. Being strongly embedded in the development logic 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010), Alpha was not motivated nor open to collaborate with these market 
parties. However, it also lacked the relevant experiential knowledge to be aware of how this deci-
sion would play out in the unfolding of the intervention. As such, these findings complement prior 
accounts that trace an organization’s reflexivity to its structural field position and exposure to insti-
tutional pressures (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) by uncovering internal organizational factors 
that may undermine an NGO’s reflexivity. This finding contrasts with known success cases where 
NGOs had accumulated trial-and-error learning, enabling greater reflexivity when designing inter-
ventions. For instance, Mair et al. (2016) describe how the NGO Gram Vikas had learned that 
implementing its water and sanitation programme too quickly would not result in durable change 
in the targeted villages and made changes in its intervention strategy accordingly. Thus, attending 
to NGO reflexivity and the internal organizational mechanisms that prompt such reflexivity is criti-
cal because constrained reflexivity may have a profound impact on the unfolding of subsequent 
intervention failures, as we argue next.
Organizational reflexivity and orchestration failures
Contrary to the portrayal of contextual bridging as a distinct activity that is predominantly per-
formed at the start of an NGO project (McKague et al., 2015; Venkataraman et al., 2016), our find-
ings suggest that contextual bridging should be seen as an ongoing dynamic. When experiential 
knowledge deficits constrain the reflexivity of NGOs and prevent them from designing interven-
tions that are sensitive to local norms, values and power disparities, negative feedback is likely to 
build up during implementation. To increase the ‘fit’ with the evolving context, NGOs may need to 
adapt their intervention, particularly because interventions may also have unintended side effects 
(Khan et al., 2007). Hence, NGOs also need reflexivity to monitor the interaction between inter-
vention and context during implementation to further contextualize their intervention. Again, 
extant studies seem to have focused on NGOs with high levels of reflexivity. For instance, CARE 
Bangladesh was aware of the potential side effects of its intervention for actors other than the tar-
geted beneficiaries and helped them to adapt to the new market structure (McKague & Oliver, 
2012). In our case, however, organizational mechanisms such as an appropriate monitoring and 
evaluation system to feed information back to the NGO and prompt such reflection were weakly 
developed, resulting in orchestration failures.
An example of how initial design decisions may trigger a development path that needs reflexive 
agency in order to be corrected in good time can be illuminating here. Alpha’s support for the 
launch of business association ProMilk (uniting both producer groups and processors) and the 
nomination of ProMilk’s president (also chair of a large dairy cooperative) as ‘chain leader’ rein-
forced incumbent processors’ initial perception that Alpha was serving the interests of poor pro-
ducers. This sidelining of incumbents is in sharp contrast to extant studies, which indicate that elite 
actors should be enlisted into the change project to co-create and negotiate ‘proto-institutions’ 
(Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) that support inclusive markets. 
For instance, CARE Bangladesh embedded lead processing firms into its change project through 
pilot projects where they experimented with new technologies to determine milk quality, a solution 
that served both farmers and processors and suffused the market (McKague et al., 2015). Likewise, 
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NGO Gram Vikas involved elites in its programme to enlist support for its intervention ‘as the 
voice of the elites is heard and accepted by the village’ (Mair et al., 2016, p. 2033). Alpha, by con-
trast, only started to leverage the position of local lead firms as it began to exit from the project by 
exploring the launch of a dairy board, a ‘proto-institution’ that incumbent processors believed 
necessary to bring the government on board and solve the quality problems in the market. Thus, 
while Alpha was insufficiently aware of how its actions might play out within the local environ-
ment due to a lack of experiential knowledge, it also lacked appropriate mechanisms to monitor the 
negative feedback from the environment necessary to adapt the intervention in good time and 
prevent orchestration failures.
Intervention outcomes
Our study suggests that it is the configuration of particular organizational reflexivity deficits that 
will trigger different patterns of failure in NGO interventions. In our case, we observed a cascading 
pattern of failure in that initial design failures evolved into subsequent orchestration failures and 
ultimately maintenance failure. In other words, the idea of establishing a dairy board as an alterna-
tive governing body to business association ProMilk was necessary, but it occurred too late. When 
Alpha began to exit, there was no organization ready to assume its role governing the dairy net-
work’s activities and participants. Alpha’s exit thus resulted in the network’s demise, which was 
caused by design and orchestration failures that occurred because Alpha lacked both the necessary 
experiential knowledge and monitoring routines.
Notwithstanding this maintenance failure, Alpha’s efforts still addressed the institutional void 
that motivated its work in the first place. Alpha’s intervention was successful in terms of opening 
up more opportunities for farmers to sell their milk and incentivizing processors to invest in their 
suppliers by supporting the rise of new (cooperative) processors. The Dairy MSN was also an 
important impetus to get government recognition for the sector. Whereas the Ethiopian govern-
ment paid scant attention to the dairy sector at the inception of the project, in the wake of the PAM 
project, dairy became part of Ethiopia’s Agricultural Growth Programme and a Livestock State 
Ministry was established. The PAM project also helped to promote multi-stakeholder networks as 
a mechanism for public deliberation in Ethiopia, a context that has had little experience with inno-
vative and open cross-sector dialogue. In a follow-up donor project, for instance, the Ethiopian 
government was actively involved in different livestock platforms. Alpha itself underwent a steep 
learning curve in using multi-stakeholder networks as a mechanism for promoting inclusive value 
chains and markets. As such, our study suggests that a cascading pattern of failure may still con-
tribute to institutional transformation processes in void-rich settings.
While our findings confirm the common critique that the time frame adopted in donor-funded 
projects is too short to realize institutional change, it does raise the speculative question of whether 
more could have been achieved if Alpha had had greater reflexivity. We postulate that experiential 
knowledge and organizational monitoring interact to determine NGO reflexivity, which in turn 
may trigger distinct patterns of failure in NGO interventions. For instance, when NGOs do have 
relevant prior experience but lack the necessary monitoring mechanisms, initial gains at the design 
stage may still be annulled by orchestration failures when the context changes unpredictably dur-
ing implementation or when unintended consequences arise. By contrast, NGOs with little relevant 
experience but strong monitoring may detect and correct design failures early on, allowing their 
interventions to yet have durable impact. Thus, as these possible pathways illustrate, our findings 
suggest that NGO interventions can be marked by very different failure processes depending on 
whether NGOs possess or lack particular reflexive capacities.
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Discussion and Conclusions
To conclude, we argue that this study has implications for three broader themes: (1) the study of 
institutional voids; (2) the study of NGOs as organizational actors; and (3) the study of failure in 
NGO interventions.
First, our study has important implications for studying institutional voids. Our study sug-
gests that when incumbent companies have vested interests in maintaining voids, they are 
unlikely to perceive NGOs with social agendas as ‘neutral third parties’. This is crucial for suc-
cessful value chain interventions, however (Morris, 2001). By highlighting the politicized nature 
of voids, our study thus calls for a closer examination of how NGOs build legitimacy for their 
interventions, preventing them from being ‘perceived as favouring particular sectarian interests’ 
(Morris, 2001, p. 129). Studying NGO legitimacy is indeed salient as NGOs are being increas-
ingly criticized and scrutinized not only on their accountability and transparency (Chowdhury, 
2017; Reimann, 2005), but also on their market-centric interventions in contexts of poverty 
(Chowdhury & Willmott, 2019).
Here, we believe that our insights on voids as contested spaces help to connect scholars of inter-
national business and institutional theory, as called for by Doh, Rodrigues, Saka-Helmhout and 
Makhija (2017). While strategic responses to institutional change projects are a central theme in 
institutional theory (Oliver, 1991), there has been little systematic exploration of resistance by 
incumbents or other local (elite) actors to void-filling interventions. In developing an understand-
ing of the contested nature of voids, institutional theory could benefit greatly from international 
business scholars who highlight that incumbent firms may be motivated to maintain voids and 
block institutional reforms to protect their interests (Carney, 2004; Doh et al., 2017).
Second, by showing the need for NGOs to be reflexive towards the politicized nature of voids 
and by uncovering two organizational mechanisms for prompting such reflexivity, our study sug-
gests that we must focus less on what NGOs do to promote inclusive markets and more on how 
NGOs overcome setbacks and handle negative feedback in making markets work for the poor. As 
such, our study heeds Suddaby’s (2010) call to redirect attention from outside to inside organiza-
tions and underscores the need to study NGOs as distinct organizational actors (Watkins et al., 
2012). More work is needed to better understand how NGOs can increase their reflexivity over 
time through learning within and across interventions, using organizational mechanisms like ‘net-
works of practice’ (Agterberg, van den Hooff, Huysman, & Soekijad, 2010). Future research could 
also explore the idea that local NGOs may have higher levels of reflexivity compared to Western-
based NGOs, given prior assertions that ‘only the locally embedded really have the in-depth under-
standing of local contexts to be able to unpick the complexities and to anticipate the ramifications 
of attempted interventions’ (Khan et al., 2010, p. 1431).
Third, our study has important implications for studying failure in NGO interventions in con-
texts of poverty, which remain poorly understood and theorized in organization science (Martí & 
Mair, 2009). Whereas we have described a cascading pathway of failures in a single case, future 
research could further explore other failure patterns in NGO interventions. Future research could 
also study different pathways to failure at the organizational field level. NGOs in contexts of pov-
erty do not operate in isolation. In fact, many donor-funded NGO projects run in parallel with or in 
sequence to one another. This raises pertinent questions on how knowledge about success and 
failure is diffused throughout the organizational field, thereby affecting the collective knowledge 
base on what does and does not work to successfully bring about change in contexts of poverty. It 
is these knowledge flows that might prompt NGO reflexivity given that organizations not only 
learn from direct experience with failure, but also from the failure experiences of similar organiza-
tions (Madsen & Desai, 2010).
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In conclusion, in reporting on how a development NGO launched a multi-stakeholder network 
to promote inclusive markets in Ethiopia, our study contributes to the vibrant institutional literature 
on how NGOs operate as intermediaries of change, while also reflecting the increased scholarly 
interest in how organizations address complex societal problems like persistent poverty.
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